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a new, wiser, and more realistic beginning to this
beginning.
LINDA A. MALONE

William andMaryLaw School
Genocide: A Normative Account. By Larry May.
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 283. Index. $85, cloth;
$28.99, paper.
The crime of genocide occupies a special place
in the lexicon of international law. In the public
imagination, it is the crime ofcrimes,' a signifier of
the worst offenses that people have committed
against their fellow humans. For the history of
international law and international institutions,
the offense's codification in the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
ofGenocide (Genocide Convention) 2 exemplified
a turning point in which states committed themselves to a new global order rooted in collective
security and in the protection of human rights.
The word "genocide," first coined during World
War II, also stands as a memorial to the horrors of
the Holocaust by providing a new vocabulary to
describe a singular crime.
Yet, despite this pedigree- or perhaps in part
because of it-the legal and moral concept of
genocide as a distinct offense remains troublesome
and elusive. How and why should one distinguish
this crime of crimes from other offenses of similar
scale and cruelty that, for one reason or another, do
not satisfy the elements of genocide? How, in particular, should one parse the language of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide by reference to particular offenses committed with "intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such"? 3 Recent years
have tested this definition, with mass atrocities in
the Balkans, Rwanda, and Sudan sparking controversy over their legal characterization, and with a
'See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2d
ed. 2009).
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045,
78 UNTS 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
3
Id., Art. II.
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proliferation of international criminal tribunals
and the International Court ofJustice called upon
to adjudicate the meaning of genocide. At times,
the focus on genocide has threatened to become a
distraction, as if to label these crimes something
other than genocide is to diminish their gravity,
rendering their victims less victimized or less worthy of international attention.' Lurking behind
the technical, definitional debates, moreover, is a
deeper question regarding the very coherence of
genocide as a distinct offense. Is the crime reducible to a normatively satisfying legal definition,
one that identifies distinct harms deserving separate legal recognition? Or perhaps is the symbolic
weight of genocide more than the law can bear?
Larry May, the W. Alton Jones Professor ofPhilosophy and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University, takes on these and related questions in
Genocide: A NormativeAccount. The book is the
fourth installation in what the author originally
conceived as a trilogy focused on the normative
foundations of the core international criminal
offenses.' Together, these books establish May as
one of the foremost theorists of the still emerging
domain of international criminal law. This latest
work joins its predecessor volumes as required
reading for scholars in the field. Like those volumes, Genocide is neither a comprehensive legal
treatise nor a historical study, terrain already well
covered by other authors. Instead, it grapples with
' David Luban, for example, has noted the media's
fixation on genocide in the context of Darfur. When the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur issued
a report in January 2005 detailing evidence of serious
international offenses, media headlines focused inordinately on the Commission's failure to find conclusive
evidence ofgenocide. David Luban, CallingGenocideby
Its Rightful Name: Lemkin's Word Darfur,and the UN
Report, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 303, 303-04 (2006). One

headline described the UN as "Clear[ing] Sudan of
Genocide," whereas several others described the Darfur
atrocities as "Not Genocide" or "Short ofGenocide." Id.
at 304.

5 For the predecessor volumes, see LARRY MAY,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE
ACCOUNT (2004); LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND
JUST WAR (2007); LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND
CRIMES AGAINST PEACE (2008). May has since pub-

lished a fifth book focused on procedure, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS (2011), and he will soon have
an additional book, AFTER WAR ENDS: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 2012).
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the normative foundations of the crime of genocide. In this pursuit, May's work is wide-ranging,
and its numerous contributions resist easy summary. The bulk of May's argument develops a
qualified normative justification of genocide as a
crime focused on a distinct harm: the loss of identity and status suffered by members of a group on
account of efforts to destroy the group. This justification, May argues, flows from his nominalist
position that groups as such do not exist in any
objective sense and thus cannot be said to suffer
harms. The unique harm of genocide, therefore, is
one suffered by victims whose lives find meaning
in the intersubjective experience ofgroup identity.
This justification is qualified, however, as May's
account departs in two respects from traditional
notions about genocide. First, May proposes significant revisions to the definition ofgenocide. He
would expand the range of groups protected, and
he would also expand the list of prohibited acts to
include forms of so-called cultural genocide committed through forced displacement and deprivation of language. Second, May rejects popular
views concerning the singularity of genocide. He
urges that "we should not continue to talk of the
harm of genocide as morally unique and worse
than all other international crimes, and hence we
should not continue to talk of genocide as the
crime of crimes" (p. 78).
In addition to advancing his normative justification for criminalizing genocide as a distinct
crime, May dedicates a significant portion of his
book to various other claims having to do with the
law of genocide. He dedicates individual chapters
to the mens rea of genocide, to the actus reus of
genocide, to forms of culpability for genocide, and
to the implications of genocide for debates concerning military intervention and the role of reconciliation in addressing past atrocities.
The centerpiece of May's account is his search
for the singular harm of genocide, that which justifies the codification of genocide as a distinct
offense. Drawing upon Claudia Card's description of genocide as "social death" (p. 78, quoting
Card), May argues that genocide is distinguished
by a "loss of status and identity" by victims who
"will often feel a very significant psychic loss and
social disorientation" on account having been
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deprived of the group attachments that are central
to personal identity (p. 83). This account is
intriguing and does indeed capture some of the
horror that one associates with genocide. But it is
problematic to argue, as May does, that this harm
alone justifies the isolation ofgenocide as a distinct
crime. In the first place, this account seems inordinately focused on the suffering of survivors,
those who personally escape the destruction of
their groups but are forced to live out their lives
with a resulting loss ofsocial identity. This victimization, however severe, seems peripheral to the
suffering of those actually killed as direct targets of
genocidal campaigns. May is right to observe that
those killed by genocide can also suffer psychic loss
prior to physical death,' but given the vagaries of
context and the abundant forms that suffering
may take among those who are brutalized and facing annihilation, it is speculative to attach central
importance to only a single type of suffering,
which may or may not loom large in the psyches of
individual victims. For example, the members of a
group instantaneously destroyed by a nuclear
attack will unlikely have time to experience the
social death that May posits. Assuming the attack
is undertaken with the requisite genocidal intent,
should the victims' lack of foreknowledge nevertheless disqualify us from labeling the crime a
genocide?
May's focus on psychic harm also raises difficult
questions regarding the relative significance of the
social death that he posits. All things being equal,
one could expect that survivors will experience
greater personal loss from the particular destruction of family, home, friends, and local community-none exclusive to the crime of genocidethan from the destructive impact of genocide on
the larger group as a whole. May acknowledges
that "it seems the loss of a family member would
normally produce more psychic distress than
would the forced disconnection from one's group"
(pp. 83-84), and he responds by noting ways in
which the loss of group identity of status presents
harms that are both severe and distinct. For

6May explains

that "it also seems sensible to say that

a person who has lost a significant group affiliations
before death has a worse death than a person who does
not" (p. 87).

HeinOnline -- 105 Am. J. Int'l L. 853 2011

854

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

instance, "[G]roup identity forms part of the
mechanism by which people are recognized and
identified in society" and "is sometimes a bulwark
against loneliness and aloneness that would make
one vulnerable to loss of rights protections, as is
true of those who are Stateless." (p. 89). But these
observations on the undeniable importance of
group identity do not, however, address how the
emotional loss associated with these harms compares to other forms of emotional loss that are not
the focus of a unique criminal offense.
May also concedes that the "main harm ofmany
genocides is that which is shared in common with
some of the crimes against humanity, and also
with some other international crimes, namely,
physical destruction primarily of human beings
and communities" (p. 93). Thus, the harm unique
to genocide is not the most important harm associated with genocide. Although this concession is
helpful in assessing how to weigh the gravity of
genocide in comparison to other offenses, it, too,
does not explain why one particular type of mental
suffering, and not others, necessitates its own
criminal offense.
Curiously, May does not address the normative
justification that, as a historical matter, figured
prominently in the drafting of the Genocide Convention: namely, the idea that genocide victimizes
all of humanity "by depriving it of the cultural and
other contributions of the group so destroyed."'
Perhaps May would find this justification problematic. One may rightly critique it for embracing
' Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Secretariat Draft, UN Doc.
E/447 (May 1947); see also GA Res. 96 (I) (Dec. 11,
1946) ("Genocide... results in great losses to humanity
in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups."). This rationale traces
back to work of Raphael Lemkin, who both coined the
term "genocide" and spearheaded the movement to
establish genocide as an international crime. Lemkin
reasoned that "the world represents only so much culture and intellectual vigor as are created by its component national groups. Essentially the idea of a nation
signifies constructive cooperation and individual contributions, based upon genuine traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national psychology. The
destruction ofa nation, therefore, results in the loss ofits
future contributions to the world." RAPHAEL LEMKIN,
Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 91 (1944) (footnote omitted).
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an essentialist and reductionist view of identity
rooted in nineteenth century German romanticism. But as a prima facie matter, this rationale
supplies a coherent explanation for how the crime
of genocide came to be codified as it did, with its
definition focused on protecting the types of
group identities that are most commonly associated with distinct cultural traditions.
May dedicates several chapters to the individual
elements of the crime of genocide. A chapter on
group identity grapples with the types of groups
listed in the Genocide Convention being social
constructs, ones that are often quite malleable
and contested. This problem has famously arisen
in the genocide case law of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which
emphasized intersubjective considerations in ruling that Rwanda's Tutsi were a distinct ethnic
group, despite being indistinguishable from the
majority Hutu population based on racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural criteria. The tribunal emphasized, instead, that the idea of the Tutsi
as an ethnic group had gained official juridical
acceptance in Rwanda and was embedded in the
social imagination of both Tutsi and non-Tutsi.'
May's approach follows that of the ICTR by
favoring an intersubjective approach to group
identity. In this vein, he would amend the definition of genocide to require a definition of group
identity rooted in a combination of "in-group"
self-identification and "out-group" public recognition, as the "combination of out-group and ingroup recognition of certain features as markers of
the 'existence' of a group is generally a telling sign
of the possibility that such a group could be the
4
object of harms such as genocide" (p. 9). In other
words, a group exists for purposes of the Genocide
Convention when both members and nonmembers of the posited group publicly accept the existence of the group.
While I endorse May's view that group identity
inherently revolves around these sorts ofsubjective
considerations, the required correspondence
between insider and outsider identification seems
unnecessarily strict. Imagine, for example, a colonial power that seeks to destroy the indigenous
8 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, paras. 170-71 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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population of a colonized territory. The colonizers
treat this population as homogenous and justify
the destruction based on claims of racial inferiority. The victims, by contrast, do not define themselves in racial terms or with a common identity as
they are themselves divided into various, often
competing, clans reflecting a diversity of linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions. Although
both the perpetrator and the victim would agree
that one or more protected groups are being
destroyed, the perpetrator's intended target-the
indigenous population as a single racial grouphas no in-group identification, thus suggesting
that May's requirements are not met.
To take a historical example, it is unclear how
even the Holocaust-which directly inspired the
Genocide Convention and which May describes
as a paradigmatic genocide-fares under May's
model. According to the Nazi racial ideology, a
self-identifying Christian citizen of Poland with
no matrilineal link to Judaism might still be subjected to the gas chambers on account ofbiological
descent from one or more Jewish grandparents.
But a strict application of May's approach would
suggest that this victim, assuming that she does not
self-identify as Jewish, is not a victim of genocide.
As this example shows, even where there is public
agreement that a group known as "Jews" exists, the
term can be a floating signifier conveying different
meanings to different people.
Both cases, in my view, should qualify as genocide. Part of the horror lies precisely in the perpetrator's reduction of rich, complex human lives to
a single group label. Grotesque oversimplification
is endemic to the history of genocide, and it would
be odd to deny liability on the ground that the perpetrator's view of group identity is too simplistic.
May defends his apparently stricter standard by
arguing that a correspondence between in-group
and out-group identification is necessary to avoid
extending the label of genocide to perpetratorinvented categories such as "all of those persons
who wear eyeglasses" that do not correspond in
any way to meaningful group identities (p. 49).
Other ways to address that concern, however,
exist. For example, the law could require that the
perpetrator's identification of a target group meet
some reasonableness threshold, even if it turns out
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that the victim and perpetrator do not agree on the
categorization or existence of the targeted group.
Notably, May's definition would extend to the
destruction of groups not belonging to the four
9
types specified in the Genocide Convention. He
advocates an open-ended definition applying to
any "publicly recognized group that is relatively
stable and significant for the identity of its members, such as a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group, as such" (p. 58, some emphasis omitted).
Although May argues that this definition would
resolve the long-standing debate over the exclusion of social and political groups by extending
protection to them as well, he does not explain
how such groups meet his criteria. Smaller family
units-even nuclear families-seem a better fit
for May's model on account of the stability and
significance they hold for their members, but May
does not explore how we would address this counterintuitive possibility.
With respect to genocidal intent, May argues
that the commission of genocide must manifest a
deliberate purpose to destroy a group in whole or
in part. In requiring that a genocidal purpose exist
at some level, May devotes several pages to critiquing my previously published argument that awareness of destructive consequences should establish
genocidal mens rea in defined instances ofdiscriminatory acts likely to result in the destruction of a
protected group in whole or in part, even absent an
0
actual purpose to destroy the group as such.
Although May's position is the mainstream one,
his two supporting arguments do not resolve this
debate." May argues first that his view is most
9

As noted, the Genocide Convention defines genocide's mens rea by reference to an "intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such." Genocide Convention, supra note 2,
Art. II.

o See Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Rethinking GenocidalIntent: The Casefor a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2259 (1999).

" I choose to focus here on May's argument that"(ilt
is indeed crucial that there be a plan that has as its purpose the destruction of a protected group in whole or in
substantial part" (p. 126). I do not here address May's
additional arguments regarding what is, in myview, the
less central question of what individual mens rea is
required to attach culpability to individual participants
in such a plan.
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compatible with the drafting history of the Genocide Convention. Assuming that he is right (and
the matter is disputedl 2 ), the intent of the drafters
can have only limited relevance for a normative
account that does not place great emphasis on their
intent and that elsewhere proposes substantial
amendments to the existing definition of genocide. May also approvingly cites tribunal case law
upholding a purpose-based approach that takes
into account the extraordinary gravity of the crime
of genocide.'" This reliance on extraordinary gravity sits in tension with May's view that genocide
"should not be seen as morally unique and significantly worse legally than all other serious international crimes" (p. 1). These other crimes have no
comparable purpose requirement.
May's approach would also benefit from a more
fact-specific exploration of what exactly genocidal
mens rea entails. Imagine, for example, that officials investigating crimes for the International
Criminal Court (ICC) come into possession of a
tape recording of the following hypothetical conversation between a hypothetical political leader
and a hypothetical military commander:
1. Political Leader: It is time to crush the rebellion once and for all. I have determined that
we must exterminate the non-Arab population of our country.
2. Military Commander: To be clear, this will
entail the destruction of three ethnic groups:
the X, the Y, and the Z.
3. Political Leader: Yes, I am aware of that.
4. Military Commander: Shall we then proceed with the destruction of those three ethnic groups?
5. Political Leader: Yes, we must destroy the X,
the Y, and the Z.
The evolution of how Political Leader frames
her plan may seem to be purely a matter of semantics, but if I have read both May's work and the relevant case law correctly, it is only when we reach
Statement 5 that we have clear evidence of genocidal intent. Because the negatively defined nonSee Greenawalt,supra note 10, at 2270 -79.
In this context May quotes Prosecutor v. Krtil,
Judgment, No. IT-98-33-A, para. 134 (Apr. 19,
12
13

2004) (p. 128).
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Arab population described in Statement 1 is not
itselfa national, ethnical, racial, or religious group,
this statement runs afoul of an ICC pretrial chamber ruling, in the context ofallegations of genocide
against Darfur's not-Arab population, that genocide is "a matter ofwho the targeted people are, not
who they are not. Statement 1 also does not pass
May's more expansive account of group identity
because, unless the victim population self-identifies as part of a general non-Arab group (rather
than simply as members of a specific group respectively), no correspondence exists between
in-group and out-group identification.
What about Statement 3? It comes closer
because now Political Leader has manifested her
awareness that proceeding with the campaign will
entail the destruction of three distinct ethnic
groups. But both May and the tribunal case law tell
us that such awareness is not enough. Only at
Statement 5 do we see Political Leader describe her
plan in language reflecting a purpose to destroy the
groups. Even here, one may protest that the true
purpose remains the general destruction of nonArabs, rather than the destruction of the particular
groups. But that ulterior purpose is now irrelevant
pursuant to the view that it is specific intentions,
rather than motives, that matter for genocidal
intent. May argues that "motive should not be part
of the elements of any crime, and most especially
the crime of genocide" (p. 138). That Political
Leader's intention to destroy the groups is motivated by a broader Arab chauvinism or by political
self-preservation is no more relevant than that an
architect of the Holocaust may have been motivated by a desire to preserve German racial purity
or to achieve personal enrichment.
My problem with this purpose-driven account
is that I cannot identify a moral justification for
distinguishing between the three mental states
14 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3,
Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant
ofArrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, para.
135 (Mar. 4, 2009). The ICC appeals chamber subsequently reversed the trial chamber ruling on the unrelated ground of having applied the wrong burden of
proof at the pretrial stage. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir,
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-OA, Judgment on the Appeal of
the Prosecutor Against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant ofArrest Against Omar
Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir" (Feb. 3, 2010).
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manifested by Political Leader. She herself would
be unlikely to acknowledge or even perceive a shift
in her intentions as she progressed from Statement
1 to Statement 5. The destructive effect-including the extent of lost status and identity suffered by
the victims-is the same regardless of how the
leader frames her plan behind closed doors. And
despite rhetorical support for a strict mens rea
standard, the tribunal case law has been far from
5
consistent in applying the law to actual cases.' A
robust defense of the purpose-based approach to
genocide therefore requires more attention to
these ambiguities than the existing case law and literature-including May's work-have given it.
Whereas May defends a narrow construction of
intent, he argues that the list of enumerated genocidal acts should be broadened to include forcible
transfers of populations (so-called "ethnic cleansing") and the suppression of native language. This
proposal revives drafting-era debates over whether
and to what extent the Genocide Convention
should recognize crimes of so-called cultural genocide. Here, May's views flow logically from his
argument that loss of identity and status, rather
than physical destruction, defines genocide. He
also finds support in the Genocide Convention
itself, which contemplates that genocide can be
accomplished through the culturally destructive
act of "[florcibly transferring children of the
group to another group" (p. 109)." May defends
against slippery-slope objections by observing that
none of the additional acts he identifies could be
genocidal unless committed with the requisite
genocidal intent. Nevertheless, his proposal
exposes itselfto a different objection: that it dilutes
the concept ofwhat it means to "destroy" a group,
15 Most notably, in ruling that the murder of 8,000
men in and around Srebrenica reflected genocidal
intent, an ICTY trial chamber observed that the "Bosnian Serb forces could not have failed to know, by the
time they decided to kill all the men, that this selective destruction of the group would have a lasting
impact upon the entire group." Krstil, No. IT
98-33-T, Judgment, para. 595 (Aug. 1, 2001). Elsewhere in the same decision, however, the same trial
chamber expressly rejected the view that mere awareness of group destruction is sufficient for genocidal
intent. Id., para. 571.
16 See also Genocide Convention, supra note 2, Art.
11(e).
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given that group identities can and often have
survived geographic dislocation and linguistic
changes. The perseverance of Jewish identity
across different regions and languages is just one
among many examples.
May rounds out his book with chapters focusing on standards of individual responsibility for
genocide and on the respective problems of
humanitarian intervention and postconflict reconciliation. Although much is of interest here, the
material is largely tangential to May's core normative account. These chapters are also vulnerable to
the critique that they deal with general issues of
criminal law and international policy that are not
uniquely affected by the specific context of genocide. Thus, for example, in his chapter on complicity, May argues that "legal complicity that leads to
criminal prosecution should be restricted to those
cases where one knows, or should have known,
that one is in a sense participating in an enterprise,
by one's commission or omission, that risks harm"
(p. 170). This negligence-based standard would
stretch the limits ofcriminal responsibility beyond
that which has prevailed in domestic or international criminal law. Yet May neither explores
whether he thinks that the law of complicity
should be different for genocide than for other
crimes nor situates his argument in the context of
existing national approaches to complicity, which
also reflect substantial differences among legal systems." May's analysis of individual liability is also
selective. Although he dedicates chapters to complicity and incitement, he includes no material on
conspiracy and attempt, both punishable under
the Genocide Convention." In addition, he does
not address the doctrines ofsuperior responsibility

" See Markus Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A
Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 977
(2007). I have argued elsewhere that international law
does not have the same stake in resolving differences
among domestic approaches to the general part ofcriminal law-including modes of liability-as it does in
defining international offenses such as genocide, crimes

against humanity, and war crimes. See Alexander K. A.
Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal
Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063 (2011).
s Genocide Convention, supra note 2, Art. III.
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and joint criminal enterprise, each of which international tribunals have employed to convict suspects and each ofwhich has provoked debate in the
context of genocide. 9
Similar problems pervade May's chapters on
humanitarian intervention and reconciliation.
Both topics-whether the prevention of serious
international crimes can justify otherwise illegal
military interventions and how one should balance the interests of postconflict reconciliation
with those of retribution-have commanded substantial analysis and debate. These questions arise
in the context of genocide, but neither is exclusive
to the crime of genocide. With respect to humanitarian intervention, he argues that the particular
gravity of genocide affects the balancing that must
take place when deciding whether, under the circumstances, atrocities are sufficiently severe to justify intervention. This point is relatively modest,
but its emphasis on gravity once again highlights
the core ambiguity in May's argument that genocide involves unique harm but is not morally
unique compared to all other international
offenses.
The central difficulties in the law of genocide
are not, of course, ones of May's making, and his
book deserves credit for carefully revealing both
the necessity of a normative justification and the
complex nature of that project. Whether May succeeds in justifying the offense's group-based focus
is a more debatable question. I suspect that many
of May's readers will be equally inclined to abandon the idea of genocide as a meaningful legal concept or perhaps to agree with David Luban that the
concept of genocide must extend beyond group
destruction to include all large-scale massacres
that are currently proscribed by the crime against
humanity of extermination. 20 In either event,
Genocide: A Normative Account will be required
reading for those pursuing these questions.
ALEXANDER K. A. GREENAWALT

Pace University School ofLaw
19

66.
20

See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 1, at 351-55, 361See Luban, supra note 4, at 319-20.
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BRIEFER NOTICE
Commentario breve al diritto dell'arbitratonazionale edinternazionale.By Massimo V. Benedettelli, Claudio Consolo, and Luca G. Radicati di
Brozolo. Milan: CEDAM, 2010. Pp. xxxv,
1062. Index. C130.
This Italian book is both unusual and innovative. It is not a traditional commentary on legal
texts. Instead, in a single volume, it adopts a new
approach to collecting and analyzing the norms
governing Italian and international arbitration.
The authors, Professors Benedettelli, Consolo,
and Radicati di Brozolo, are three well-known Italian academics who are also highly respected international arbitration practitioners. They directed
and coordinated the work with the assistance of
thirty colleagues, both Italian and non-Italian. All
have extensive arbitration expertise.
Commentariois divided in two parts. The first,
characterized by a more "classical" method, concerns domestic Italian arbitration. This part provides a traditional overview of the principles of
Italian civil procedure and various laws governing
specialized arbitral proceedings in corporate law,
labor law, and administrative law. The second part
of the book, more relevant to the present review,
focuses on international arbitration. It seeks to be
a practical tool for international arbitration practitioners and to contribute to a deeper understanding and greater development of international arbitration in Italy. The introduction to the second
part explains the characteristics of international
arbitration and highlights its main differences
from domestic arbitration, particularly useful to
readers who are less experienced in international
arbitration.
Instead of analyzing a single normative source
as is usually done by most treatises, the discussion
of international arbitration provides a detailed
assessment of the different applicable norms from
a variety ofsources: Italian law, foreign laws, international law, treaties and conventions, and the
rules of arbitral institutions. Commentariois based
on the premise that international arbitration- by
its very nature-relies on interrelated sources,
such as codified norms and arbitral case law and
practice (the transnational lex arbitri).
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